the dust settle," allow Sino-Soviet contradictions to develop, and work to draw the PRC away from the USSR. When the Eisenhower administration decided during its first eighteen months in office to intensify pressure on the Sino-Soviet alliance with the objective of eventually breaking it apart, this was done on the implicit understanding that Europe was the epicenter of U.S. interests, with the USSR representing the greatest threat to those interests. Moscow, not Beijing, was recognized as the greatest global challenge to the West. Pressure on the Sino-Soviet alliance was maintained until that alliance eventually split. The result, however, was a U.S. tilt toward Moscow, not Beijing. Why?
The hatreds generated by the Korean War can explain only so much. Kang and Kaufman both conclude that the Kennedy administration attempted to use food aid as a tentative wedge toward opening the way to improved relations with the PRC. In June 1961, Ambassador Jacob Beam in Warsaw told PRC Ambassador Wang Bingnan that the United States might consider allowing private food donations. Wang "summarily rejected" the U.S. proposal, according to Kaufman. A year later, Kang found, another U.S. ambassador, John Cabot, reiterated a similar offer in Warsaw. On this occasion too, "the suggestion was rejected by the Chinese ambassador outright," according to Kang. Washington was ready to try a third time in late May 1962, Kang found, but before its ambassador in Warsaw could broach the possibility of the United States considering commercial grain sales to China, a stern statement by Foreign Minister Chen Yi ruled out Chinese acceptance of any U.S. aid. Throughout the period when the United States attempted to use food aid as a mechanism toward improving Sino-U.S. relations, Beijing's militant international behavior continued unmitigated-in Indochina, in Tibet, and on the Sino-Indian frontier. According to Kang, "The most decisive factor mitigating against a change in Sino-American relations was the increasingly belligerent posture assumed by Peking."
A full explanation of China's rejection of the U.S. initiative in 1961-62 must await an examination of China's archives. A tentative explanation only is possible at this point. It seems probable that China's leaders Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yi-understood the broad purpose behind the Kennedy administration's offers of food aid: as a first move toward improved U.S.-PRC relations. They were not interested in this at that particular juncture. The modalities of the U.S. bid (the demand for a Chinese "request," and so on) were probably not fundamental. Had China's leaders been interested in a broad redefinition of U.S.-PRC relations, they could have found an appropriately indirect and subtle way of
